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Summary
Concerned by reported security and counterintelligence (CI) lapses at the
Department of Energy (DOE), Congress in 1999 established a semi-autonomous
agency — the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) — to oversee
DOE’s national security-related programs.  Within NNSA, Congress established the
Office of Defense Nuclear Counterintelligence to implement NNSA’s
counterintelligence program.  Although DOE’s existing Office of Counterintelligence
develops CI policy for both agencies, it implements policy only at non-NNSA
facilities. Some studies have questioned the effectiveness of a dual office structure
in combating foreign espionage and have urged the adoption of an alternative
structure.  Several alternative organizational approaches have been discussed,
including the following.  
One approach, reportedly approved but not yet initiated, would merge under the
control of a new DOE intelligence agency DOE’s Office of Intelligence, which
assesses foreign nuclear weapons programs, and DOE’s CI office.  As part of an
anticipated second phase, NNSA’s CI office would be consolidated under the DOE’s
intelligence agency. Proponents assert that such a consolidation would improve
command, control, and communication.  Opponents argue that consolidation would
dilute the counterintelligence attention DOE’s weapons labs now receive.
Under a second approach, the DOE and NNSA CI programs could be
consolidated under the control of the NNSA administrator.  Proponents argue that a
semi-autonomous agency such as NNSA, by virtue of its independence, is better able
to implement CI measures than is DOE. Opponents contend that such a consolidation
would undermine the effectiveness of a counterintelligence program, which they
argue requires a consolidated DOE-wide program that includes NNSA and is under
the direct control and supervision of the Energy Secretary.
  
Under a third approach, DOE could integrate its Office of Intelligence and CI
office under a new DOE intelligence agency, but allow NNSA’s CI office to remain
as a separate entity. Proponents argue that such an approach would not eliminate the
current bifurcated structure — a preferred outcome — but  would enhance overall
communication and coordination between the two existing programs.  Opponents
counter that only way to resolve coordination and communication problems is to
consolidate the two CI programs within DOE.
A fourth approach would be to completely separate the DOE and NNSA
counterintelligence programs.  Proponents suggest that such an approach would
clarify the chain of command. Opponents assert that separation could further
undermine coordination and communication.  
A final approach would be to maintain the status quo.  Proponents suggest that
the current structure is required for counterintelligence to receive focused attention
at the weapons labs.  Opponents counter that dual offices are inefficient and
ultimately ineffective.  This report will be updated as warranted.
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Introduction
Lapses in the Department of Energy’s (DOE’s) security and counterintelligence
programs have plagued DOE since 1977, when the department was established by
merging 40 government organizations, including the Energy Research and
Development Administration and the Federal Energy Administration.1  The purpose
in establishing the new agency was to focus the government’s research centers on
finding solutions to the energy crisis then confronting the United States.  The view,
according to some, is that DOE’s establishment represented an unsuccessful attempt
to merge more than 40 different government agencies and organizations, an event
from which DOE arguably has never recovered.2    
Congress created the semi-autonomous National Nuclear Security
Administration (NNSA) in 1999 in the wake of a recommendation by the President’s
Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB) that DOE’s weapons research and
stockpile management functions should be placed wholly within a new semi-
autonomous agency within DOE “that has a clear mission, streamlined bureaucracy,
and drastically simplified lines of authority and accountability.”3  Since then,
however, some observers have questioned whether the current dual
counterintelligence (CI) office structure established by Congress — with DOE
operating one counterintelligence office and NNSA a second, independent one — is
the most effective structure to combat foreign espionage.  Or, as some have warned,
does such a bifurcated structure expose both agencies to the possibility of future
counterintelligence missteps because it contributes to coordination and
communications problems?4   
One of DOE’s legacies has been its continuing struggle to strike an acceptable
balance between open scientific inquiry and the need to protect highly sensitive and
classified information that comprises many of those inquiries.  In the past, this
inherent tension led many observers to question whether the security of DOE’s highly
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5 Those CI programs sharing resources, funds, and personnel include analysis, cyber-
counterintelligence, evaluations, inspections, investigations, polygraph, and training.
6 See  Commission on Science and Security, Science and Security in the 21st Century, A
Report to the Secretary of Energy on the Department of Energy Laboratories, April 2002,
p. XII and p. 26.  See also National Counterintelligence Executive, An Assessment of the
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National Nuclear Security Administration, pp. 12-13.
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8 For a comprehensive review of this issue, see CRS Report RL30143, China: Suspected
Acquisition of U.S. Nuclear Weapon Secrets, by Shirley Kan.
9 The FBI has primary responsibility for domestic counterintelligence. 
10 See President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, Foreword, Science At Its
Best/Security At Its Worst, June 1999, p. 15.
classified weapons-related program, particularly with regard to CI, has received
sufficient attention.  These and other concerns prompted the Clinton Administration
to issue a Presidential Decision Directive (PDD-61) in which he ordered DOE to
fundamentally restructure its counterintelligence program.  PDD-61 called for a
number of changes, including one that placed the Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI) in charge of DOE’s counterintelligence program.  In 1999, Congress went
further by establishing the semi-autonomous National Nuclear Security
Administration (NNSA) and giving it control over DOE’s  national security-related
programs, including the department’s sensitive weapons laboratories.  It also
established a separate counterintelligence office within NNSA — one separate and
independent of the DOE’s Office of Counterintelligence.  This new office was given
responsibility for developing and implementing counterintelligence programs within
NNSA.  Although representing separate organizations, the two CI offices share
resources, funds, and personnel for some programs.5 
This partially bifurcated counterintelligence structure, and its long-term
effectiveness, continues to generate concern in some quarters,6  particularly given that
DOE and NNSA facilities are expected to remain major espionage targets of foreign
intelligence services.7  
DOE CI Management Prior to the 1999 Reorganization
In 1998, President Clinton issued PDD-61 out of concern about intelligence
evidence indicating that the People’s Republic of China (PRC) had stolen secrets
from DOE’s weapons laboratories.  Aimed at strengthening DOE’s
counterintelligence program,8 the President’s directive mandated the establishment
of an independent counterintelligence office — known as the Office of
Counterintelligence (OCI) — within the department and placed it under the
supervision of a senior FBI official.9  Previously, DOE’s counterintelligence program
had been highly decentralized and, according to some observers, grossly
underfunded.10   
The President’s directive also mandated that the head of the new office report
directly to the Energy Secretary and that existing DOE lab contracts be amended to
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11 The most recent alleged espionage case with a DOE connection involves alleged PRC spy
Katrina M. Leung, who the FBI said was a 20-year Bureau informant they now suspect was
a “double agent” who provided classified material to the PRC.  Leung allegedly had affairs
with two former FBI agents, William Cleveland Jr., who, until he resigned his post on April
10, 2003, was Director of Security at DOE’s Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, and
James Smith.  Leung received probation after pleading guilty to a tax charge and lying.
Smith pleaded guilty to a felony false statement charge in 2004 and was sentenced to
probation and three months home confinement.  Cleveland was never charged with a crime.
See Josh Gerstein, “Court Hears Arguments Over FBI Agent Accused of Exposing Probe,”
New York Sun, March 8, 2006.  FBI officials reportedly have said that every PRC
counterintelligence case investigated by the Bureau since 1991 may have been compromised
by Leung, including that involving Wen Ho Lee.  See Susan Schmidt and Dan Eggen, “FBI
Assesses Potential Damage From Spy Scandal,” Washington Post, April 13, 2003, p. A04.
12 See CRS Report RL30143, China: Suspected Acquisition of U.S. Nuclear Weapon Secrets,
by Shirley Kan, pp. 22-37.    
13  See President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, Science At Its Best/Security At Its
Worst, June 1999, p. 1.
14 Ibid., p.4.
take into account counterintelligence goals and compliance measures.  The directive
consolidated under the OCI Director’s control counterintelligence oversight functions
previously assigned to DOE operations and field offices.  As part of a  follow-on
implementation plan issued in 1999, the Director also assumed programming,
funding, and personnel authority over counterintelligence activities at all DOE field
offices and laboratories.  Despite these changes, a majority in Congress decided that
DOE’s counterintelligence reforms were insufficient.   
The Turning Point
March 1999 marked a turning point in DOE’s counterintelligence program.
That month Los Alamos National Security Laboratory scientist Wen Ho Lee was
fired after allegedly failing a polygraph exam.11 (Lee had also allegedly failed to
notify DOE officials about certain contacts with individuals in the PRC, to properly
safeguard classified material, and to cooperate with authorities with regard to certain
security matters.  He pleaded guilty to one felony count of unlawful retention of
national defense information; the government dropped 58 additional counts.12)  In
May of that same year, a bipartisan House Select Committee charged in a report that
was declassified that the PRC had stolen U.S. nuclear weapons secrets.  In June, the
President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB) criticized DOE for the
“worst” security record on secrecy that panel members said they had ever
encountered.13  The criticism was contained in a PFIAB report, the first of its kind to
be publicly released in the panel’s 38-year history.   Although the PFIAB dismissed
assertions of wholesale losses of nuclear weapons technology as a result of
espionage, the panel did concur, on balance, with the U.S. intelligence community’s
assessment that the PRC  had stolen classified U.S. nuclear weapons information that
probably enabled the PRC to accelerate its development of nuclear weapons.14
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15 NNSA facilities include the national security laboratories (Los Alamos National
Laboratory, Los Alamos, NM; Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Livermore, CA;
and Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, NM, and Livermore, CA); nuclear weapons
production facilities (the Pantex Plant, Amarillo, TX; Kansas City Plant, Kansas City, MO;
the Y-12 Plant, Oak Ridge, TN; the tritium operations facilities at the Savannah River Site,
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Naval reactor facilities also fall within the NNSA. 
16 See S. 1059; conference report, H.Rept. 106-301; and P.L. 106-65, signed into law on
October 5, 1999.
17 See FY2000 conference report, H.Rept. 106-301, p. 927, which accompanied S. 1059.
Congress and the President responded to the panel’s report by establishing NNSA15
and placing it charge of DOE’s national security-related nuclear programs.16
In restructuring DOE and establishing NNSA, Congress created dual
counterintelligence offices in DOE and NNSA, respectively.  Within DOE, the
already-existing Office of Counterintelligence was codified and made responsible for
establishing counterintelligence policy for both DOE and NNSA.  The department
further directed that the office be responsible for implementing CI programs at non-
NNSA facilities.  Within NNSA, the Office of Defense Nuclear Counterintelligence
was created by statute to implement DOE counterintelligence policy, but only at
NNSA facilities.  Conferees further stipulated that a presidentially appointed, Senate-
confirmed Under Secretary for Nuclear Security be designated to serve as NNSA
Administrator, and that the Administrator report directly to the Energy Secretary. 
In approving this reorganization, conferees cited the PFIAB’s report, which
blamed DOE’s counterintelligence failures on poor organization and a failure of
accountability.  Conferees also noted the PFIAB’s criticism of the DOE bureaucracy
for being dysfunctional with regard to security matters, and incapable of reform.17
Over time, this partially bifurcated CI structure has produced debate over its
effectiveness.  Critics warn that there is a  lack of communication and coordination
between the two offices that could undermine delicate counterintelligence
investigations.  Supporters of the dual office structure argue, however, that a
separate, dedicated CI office within NNSA is necessary if counterintelligence
protection of DOE’s national security laboratories is to receive the focus it warrants.
Policy Issues For Congress
In assessing the current debate over DOE counterintelligence policy, observers
have generally focused on two interrelated questions.  First, are DOE and NNSA
effectively managing their CI programs?  And second, is the current dual office
organizational structure within DOE and NNSA flawed?   
CRS-5
18 See Commission on Science and Security, Science and Security in the 21st Century, A
Report to the Secretary of Energy on the Department of Energy Laboratories, April 2002,
p. XII-XIII.
19 National Counterintelligence Executive, An Assessment of the Effectiveness of the
Division of the CI Programs at the Department of Energy and the National Nuclear Security
Administration, 2003, p. 1.  The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence requested the
report.  See S.Rept. 107-149, p. 24.  
20 Commission on Science and Security, Science and Security I the 21st Century, A Report
of the Secretary of Energy on the Department of Energy Laboratories, April 2002, p. 26;
and National Counterintelligence Executive, An Assessment of the Effectiveness of the
Division of the CI Programs at the Department of Energy and the National Nuclear Security
Administration, 2003, p. 1.  
21 See President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, Foreword, Science At Its
Best/Security At Its Worst, June 1999, p. 46.
22 Ibid., p. 47.
Are DOE and NNSA Effectively Managing 
Counterintelligence?  
In a 2002 report, the Commission on Science and Security blamed dysfunctional
management at DOE for deficiencies in DOE’s security and counterintelligence
programs, including a lack of clarity, consistency, and broad strategic planning.  The
commission criticized DOE for failing to systematically assess the espionage risk to
its programs and establish appropriate protection priorities.  It also said that DOE’s
investments in counterintelligence technology were inadequate and that its focus on
cybersecurity threats was insufficient.18 
Authors of a second study issued in January 2003 concluded that both agencies
were making progress in accomplishing their basic CI missions.19   The Office of the
National Counterintelligence Executive (NCIX) reported that DOE and NNSA were
working cooperatively, particularly in the areas of strategic planning, operating
procedures, and creating joint information-sharing systems. 
Both studies, however, contained expressions of concern about the current CI
organizational structure.20  
Is the Bifurcated Structure Most Effective?
With regard to the current bifurcated structure, two views generally prevail.
According to the first view, articulated by the PFIAB in its 1999 report, real and
lasting CI reform is “unworkable within DOE’s current structure and culture.  To
achieve the kind of protection that these sensitive labs (DOE’s national security
laboratories) must have, they and their functions must have their own autonomous
operations structure free of all the other obligations imposed by DOE management.”21
Accordingly, the PFIAB advocated the establishment within DOE of a semi-
autonomous agency, with its own separate and coherent counterintelligence program
and structure.22 
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23 See Commission on Science and Security, Science and Security in the 21st Century, A
Report to the Secretary of Energy on the Department of Energy Laboratories, April 2002,
p. 26.
24 Ibid., p. 26.
25 See National Counterintelligence Executive, An Assessment of the Effectiveness of the
Division of the CI Programs at the Department of Energy and the National Nuclear Security
Administration, 2003, p. 1.
26 Ibid., p. 2.
27 Ibid., p. 10.
28 Ibid., p. 13.
29 See letters from Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet, June 9, 2003, and from
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The Commission on Science and Security summed up the opposing view in its
2002 report, concluding:  
Counterintelligence must be an enterprise-wide function, responsible for
counterintelligence issues anywhere within the DOE complex.  Furthermore,
counterintelligence investigations, analysis, and all other counterintelligence
information must be developed within a unified organization and provided to the
Secretary and other senior officials without bureaucratic delays.  This vital
function necessitates one organization with one chief of counterintelligence
reporting to the office of the Secretary.23
The commission went on to warn that the current bifurcated counterintelligence
structure will inevitably cause counterintelligence responsibilities to fragment,
thereby preventing the establishment of a single, strong department-wide
counterintelligence program.24
NCIX appeared to concur with the commission’s view, noting in its own study
that “‘this partial bifurcation’ of CI  responsibilities at DOE not only served to further
complicate the formidable challenge of managing CI at DOE, but also endangered
the goals and implementation of an effective CI program.”25  The NCIX further stated
in its report that, “[i]n light of the history of CI investigations that foundered because
of mis-communications within well-established agencies, the two-office arrangement
has raised the odds of missteps and problems.”26 
NCIX blamed the current dual-office structure for numerous day-to-day
problems, including duplicative and at times contradictory messages to field sites;
mis-routing of sensitive CI information related to investigations; uncoordinated
communications to the FBI and the intelligence community; and dual, sometimes
inconsistent, program tasking.27 
According to one law enforcement officer cited by NCIX, the two-office
configuration “might some day lead the department to miss a serious CI breach or
prevent the conduct of an effective investigation.”28  The Directors of Central
Intelligence and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) endorsed the NCIX
findings in separate letters to the SSCI Chairman and Vice Chairman.29  
CRS-7
29 (...continued)
FBI Director Robert Mueller, July 11, 2003.  Both letters were introduced into the record
during a July 13, 2004, hearing on DOE counterintelligence consolidation conducted by the
House Energy and Commerce Subcommittee on Energy and Air Quality.  
30 Ibid., p. 3.
31 For a more complete discussion of DOE’s position on the issue of CI bifurcation, see
testimony presented by Linton Brooks, Administrator, National Nuclear Security
Administration, before the House Energy and Commerce Committee, Energy and Air
Quality Subcommittee, July 13, 2004.  
32 Section 3119, S. 2400, FY2005 Defense authorization bill. 
33 The 108th Congress voted to retain the current bifurcated CI structure.  See H.Rept. 108-
767, p. 897, accompanying H.R. 4200, the FY2005 Defense authorization bill.  
34 Congress in 2004 decided to leave the current bifurcated CI structure in place.  See
H.Rept. 108-767, p. 897, accompanying H.R. 4200, the FY2005 Defense authorization bill.
NCIX recommended in its report that the two CI offices be  consolidated under
one senior counterintelligence officer who would report directly to the DOE
Secretary and who would be responsible for department-wide counterintelligence
program.30
DOE Secretary Also Expresses Concern 
About Bifurcated CI Structure 
As part of his own review, former DOE Secretary Spencer Abraham concluded
in 2003 that the bifurcated structure was “not optimal.”  He proposed to Congress
that the department’s two CI programs be consolidated under DOE’s control, and that
the combined office report directly to the Energy Secretary.31  Instead, however, the
Senate Armed Services Committee, in the FY2005 Defense authorization bill,
authorized the DOE Secretary to consolidate the two offices, but under the control
of the NNSA administrator.32  The House disagreed, and the Senate receded to the
House’s position.  In agreeing to retain the bifurcated structure, conferees stated in
their conference report:
The conferees note that the NNSA was originally set up as a semi-autonomous
agency, in large part, to ensure that there would be adequate focus and priority
placed on counterintelligence activities. The conferees urge the
counterintelligence offices at DOE and NNSA to work together to ensure
security of both DOE and NNSA programs and facilities.33
Possible Organizational Alternatives
Congress, of course, could choose to maintain the current organizational
structure.34  If Congress, however, ultimately decides to modify the structure, a
number of organizational approaches have been proposed.  The range of alternatives
currently being discussed include the following: (1) consolidate the two
counterintelligence programs under the control of a new DOE intelligence agency;
(2) consolidate the two counterintelligence programs under the control of NNSA; (3)
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establish a new DOE intelligence agency but maintain a separate NNSA
counterintelligence program; (4) completely sever DOE’s and NNSA’s
counterintelligence programs; and (5) maintain the status quo.
Alternative One:  Consolidate DOE and NNSA CI Programs
Under New DOE Intelligence Agency
One approach, which the DOE Secretary reportedly has approved but not yet
initiated, would be to integrate the DOE’s Office of Intelligence, whose principal task
is to assess other countries’ nuclear weapons programs,35 and DOE’s CI office under
a newly created DOE intelligence agency.36  The new intelligence agency would
contain separate directorates responsible for intelligence and counterintelligence,
respectively.  In a second phase, NNSA’s CI office would be consolidated under the
new intelligence agency’s counterintelligence directorate.   
Proponents assert that such a consolidation would produce a more efficient
bureaucratic structure, one that would better serve DOE’s broader intelligence needs
and responsibilities.  Specifically, they suggest that by creating a new intelligence
agency, DOE will be able to improve coordination and communication between those
responsible for assessing foreign intelligence and those in charge of the department’s
counterintelligence programs.  Proponents also contend that by merging DOE’s and
NNSA’s CI programs under a new DOE intelligence agency, the department will be
able to clarify roles and missions and to improve coordination and communication.
Opponents believe the current bifurcated CI program — with DOE and NNSA
splitting responsibilities for counterintelligence — is the program’s principal
weakness, and favor consolidating the two CI offices within a single office in DOE.
They question, however, the advisability of placing such an integrated CI program
under the control of a new intelligence agency within DOE.  Doing so, they contend,
will weaken the authority and effectiveness of those in charge of counterintelligence
by superimposing a new bureaucratic layer between them and the DOE Secretary.
Currently the counterintelligence leadership has direct access to the Energy Secretary.
Opponents also question DOE’s commitment, and Congress’s willingness, to
eliminate the current bifurcated CI structure, which, in their view, is the principal
reason that counterintelligence efforts are not effective.  Failing to eliminate program
bifurcation and leaving NNSA’s CI program in place while permitting DOE’s new
intelligence agency to absorb the department’s CI program would only worsen
matters, according to these opponents. 
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37 The Senate Armed Services Committee approved a provision that authorized the Secretary
of Energy to consolidate DOE’s and NNSA’s counterintelligence offices within NNSA.  In
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Alternative Two:  Consolidate DOE and NNSA 
CI Programs Under NNSA
The second approach consolidates all DOE CI implementation under NNSA.37
Proponents suggest that this approach would improve coordination because NNSA
would be able to focus its resources on program implementation, while leaving
DOE’s counterintelligence office to concentrate on formulating CI policy.  They also
assert that NNSA is best suited to implement DOE’s overall CI program, because it
already is responsible for overseeing DOE’s most sensitive classified activities by
virtue of overseeing the department’s weapons labs.  Opponents counter that leaving
in place two CI offices, one responsible for policy and the other for operations, will
contribute to continuing confusion over roles and missions.  
Alternative Three:  Establish New DOE Intelligence Agency
but Maintain Separate NNSA CI Program  
This approach would integrate the DOE’s Office of Intelligence and
counterintelligence office under a new DOE intelligence agency that would develop
CI policy for DOE and NNSA, but would implement it only at non-NNSA facilities.
NNSA’s CI office would continue to function separately and remain responsible for
implementing CI policy at NNSA facilities.  Proponents concede that this approach
would fall short of a preferred goal, which would be to consolidate DOE and NNSA
counterintelligence programming, but argue that it nevertheless would enhance
counterintelligence efforts by improving communication and coordination between
the two existing programs. 
Some opponents counter the department can eliminate problems of program
fragmentation, coordination, and communication only by eliminating the current
bifurcated structure.     
Alternative Four:  Sever DOE and NNSA CI
This approach is a complete separation of DOE and NNSA counterintelligence
programs, with DOE’s new intelligence agency providing CI support to DOE through
its CI directorate, and NNSA’s program operating independently.  Proponents
suggest that this approach would clarify lines of authority for CI within DOE and
NNSA, thereby improving communication and coordination.  Opponents counter that
such an arrangement would produce chaos in the field; could lead to future problems
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Alternative Five:  Maintain Status Quo
Under this approach, DOE’s Office of Counterintelligence would continue to
be responsible for developing CI policy across DOE (including the NNSA) but
implementing that policy only at non-NNSA  facilities.  NNSA’s counterintelligence
office would continue to implement CI policy at NNSA facilities. 
Proponents of the status quo point to congressional concern in 1999 that DOE
was failing to focus necessary and appropriate attention on counterintelligence.  The
semi-autonomous NNSA and its counterintelligence office, they argue, were
established for the express purpose of having one entity outside of DOE focus on,
and be held accountable for, implementing CI  policy at DOE’s sensitive nuclear and
national security programs, including its weapons labs.  The current structure, they
assert, accomplishes that goal while maintaining a reasonably close integration of
program activities with DOE’s counterintelligence office.  Opponents counter that
the current bifurcated structure produces “inefficiency, confusion, unnecessary
contention, and mis-communication.”39  They also suggest that, “In some areas, the
NNSA structure within DOE has exacerbated the general problem of too many layers
in DOE.”40
